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Abstract. Kleptoparasitism is the stealing of food by one animal from another.
This has been modelled in various ways before, but all previous models have only
allowed contests between two individuals. We investigate a model of kleptopara-
sitism where individuals are allowed to fight in groups of more than two, as often
occurs in real populations. We find the equilibrium distribution of the population
amongst various behavioural states, conditional upon the strategies played and
environmental parameters, and then find evolutionarily stable challenging strate-
gies. We find that there is always at least one ESS, but sometimes there are two
or more, and discuss the circumstances when particular ESSs occur, and when
there are likely to be multiple ESSs.
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1. Introduction
A problem shared by all animals is finding a sufficient amount of food, and
discovering food items can involve a significant period of searching. Whilst
foraging, an individual can come into contact with conspecifics also seeking
food, and it may discover an individual already in possession of a food item.
It may then attempt to steal the food item; such stealing of items of food by
one animal from another is termed kleptoparasitism (Rothschild and Clay
1952), and is common amongst many types of animals for example insects
(Jeanne 1972), fish (Grimm and Klinge 1996) and mammals (Kruuk 1972).
It is perhaps most common in birds (see Brockmann and Barnard 1979 for
a review), and especially seabirds (Steele and Hockey 1995, Triplet et al.
1999, Spear et al. 1999).
However, the gain from attempting to steal a food item must be weighed
against the costs e.g. time wasted, risk of injury involved in a contest. The
individual must then make a choice whether to steal or not, based upon
such rewards or costs; this provides an ideal scenario for the application of
game theory (Maynard Smith, 1982). A significant body of literature using
game theoretic models to investigate kleptoparasitic behavior in nature has
been built up (e.g. Barnard and Sibly 1981; Stillmann et al. 1997; Broom
and Ruxton 1998; Ruxton and Broom 1999; Broom and Ruxton 2003).
The original model of Broom and Ruxton (1998) has been developed in a
variety of ways in recent papers. For instance Luther and Broom (2004)
showed that key dynamic assumptions of the model were correct, Broom et
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al. (2004) developed the game by allowing handling birds to surrender food
items and varying the success probability of the contestants, Broom and
Rychta´rˇ (2007) analysed the models using adaptive dynamics for the first
time, and Luther et al. (2007) considered two groups of birds, kleptopara-
sites and those which only foraged. However in each of these papers, fights
were limited to two contestants only. In all of these earlier models, the key
ingredient was this contest over food between the two animals, and where
the different models gave different results, it was often because the nature
of these contests changed from one scenario to another.
If an individual came across a contest for food already in progress, it
was not allowed to intervene. This is not always reasonable, and it has been
observed (e.g. Steele and Hockey, 1995) that large numbers of birds can
fight over the same piece of food. Such groups can be particularly visible
compared to smaller contests, and so such multiple contests may be very
common. In this paper we explore this situation by allowing challenges to
groups contesting a food item, and individuals have to decide whether to
challenge any given sized group.
We find the equilibrium distribution of the population conditional on the
strategies employed by the population members and find conditions when it
is worth challenging a group in a given situation; this is more complicated
than in the previous models (e.g. Broom and Ruxton, 1998; Broom et al.,
2004) where only single individuals could be challenged. Every individual
can choose what size groups it is prepared to challenge. We investigate how
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large a group is worth challenging and the distribution of contest sizes in
the population. We show that the only sensible strategies are to challenge
groups up to a certain maximum size, and not to challenge larger groups.
In particular we look for what parameter values such strategies are Evo-
lutionarily Stable Strategies (ESSs). We show that there is always at least
one ESS in every case, but that there can be two or more ESSs, sometimes
many.
2. The Model
Individuals are either searchers, handlers, or involved in fights. Such klep-
toparasitic contests can involve fights in groups of size i, for general i ≥ 2.
Searchers are allowed to challenge groups already involved in a contest, thus
increasing the number of contestants by one. Note that in the original model
of Broom & Ruxton (1998) individuals were only allowed to fight in groups
of size two.
Transitions between the states occur according to a continuous time
Markov chain, so every possible transition is associated with a single rate.
Food is found at rate νff , and is handled at rate 1/th. All fights, irrespec-
tive of the size of the groups, end at rate 1/tc, where tc is the expected
duration of a contest. We assume this for the sake of simplicity; in particu-
lar the calculations for Section 3.1 relating to optimal strategies would be
greatly complicated if contest time varied. In Broom and Ruxton (1998) and
subsequent papers, where all such contests contained two individuals, this
average fighting time tc was written as ta/2. The proportion of searchers
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Meaning
νff the rate at which food items are found
1/th the rate at which food items are handled
1/tc the rate at which fights are resolved
µ1 the rate at which handlers are found
µi the rate at which groups of i fighters are found
s the proportion of searchers in the population
h the proportion of handlers in the population
fi the proportion of individuals in groups of size i
gi gi = fi/i, the relative density of groups of i individuals; g1 = h
p1 the probability a handler is challenged if found
pi the probability a group of i fighters is challenged if found
p the challenging strategy, p= (p1, p2, p3, . . .)
Vk the strategy to challenge groups of size < k only
pii the probability of becoming a handler when currently in Gi
ρi the probability that a new individuals joins Gi
Xk any value X if all individuals play Vk
(e.g. gi becomes gi,k)
Table 1. A summary of model parameters (top section) and notation (bottom
section).
and handlers in the population are labelled s and h respectively. In Broom
and Ruxton (1998) the density of searchers and handlers S and and H were
considered, so that s = S/P and h = H/P . The proportion of individuals
involved in a contest of size i is labelled fi (f2 = A/P in e.g. Broom et
al., 2004), and the consequent ratio of the number of groups of size i to
the population size is gi = fi/i. Searchers find groups of size i fighting over
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food at rate µigi (so that the rate of finding a handler is µ1h, equivalent
to νhH = νhhP in Broom and Ruxton (1998), and thus Pµ1 = µh). When
a searcher sees a group of size i, it challenges with probability pi (so the
probability of challenging a handler is p1). These probabilities may be fixed
properties of the population, or be potentially different for different indi-
viduals. We will be particularly interested in the optimal values of pi if all
possibilities are allowed in the population. When contests end each group
member is equally likely to be the winner, and emerge as a handler, all
others becoming searchers. The parameters of the model are summarised in
Table 1 and the transitions are shown in Figure 1.
The transitions translate into the following system of differential equa-
tions for s, h and gi.
ds
dt
=
h
th
− νffs+ 1
tc
∞∑
i=2
(i− 1)gi − µ1p1sh− s
∞∑
i=2
µipigi (1)
dh
dt
= νffs− h
th
− µ1p1sh+ 1
tc
∞∑
i=2
gi (2)
dgi
dt
= µi−1sgi−1pi−1 − 1
tc
gi − giµispi i = 2, 3, . . . (3)
As shown in the Appendix, the equilibrium solutions are given by
h = thνffs (4)
g2 =
tcµ1p1thνffs
2
1 + tcµ2p2s
(5)
gi = g2
i∏
j=3
(
µj−1pj−1s
µjpjs+ 1/tc
)
(6)
where s is a solution of
1 = s(1 + thνff) + thνffs
∞∑
i=2
i
i∏
j=2
(
tcµj−1pj−1s
tcµjpjs+ 1
)
(7)
Kleptoparasitic melees 7
νff
1/th
µ1hp1 µ1sp1
1/tc 1/tc
µ2sp2
2/tc 1/tc
1/tc
µ2g2p2
µi−1gi−1pi−1(i− 1)/tc
s h
g2
g3
gi
µi−1spi−1
µ3sp3
µispi
Fig. 1. Schematic description of the model.
Since the right hand side of (??) is monotone in s, it is clear that there
is always a unique solution of (??). Also note that if p1 > 0 and pi = 0, for
all i > 1, then (??) recovers the original Broom & Ruxton (1998) model.
As further shown in the Appendix, the expected time to become a han-
dler for a searching individual who uses a strategy q = (q1, q2, . . .) in the
population where everybody else uses a strategy p = (p1, p2, . . .) is
TS =
1 + tc
∑∞
i=1 µigiqi
νff +
∑∞
i=1 µigiqipii+1
. (8)
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where
pii =
1
i
−
∞∑
l=i
1
l(l + 1)
l∏
j=i
(
tcµjpjs
1 + tcµjpjs
)
(9)
is the probability to become a handler when currently in the group of size
i.
Note that TS can be considered as the sole indicator of the fitness of
an individual: the shorter the time, the higher the fitness. The fitness of an
individual is in reality the rate at which it consumes food. It can consume
food (at average rate 1/th) if and only if it is the handling state, so that
an individual’s mean consumption rate is h/th (Broom and Ruxton, 1998).
Any individual goes through searching periods of length TS when it is either
looking for a food item or fighting for an item as a challenger and through
handling and defending periods where it is either handling or defending the
food item against challenger(s). Varying an individual’s own challenging
strategy has an effect on the duration of the searching period. However,
since in this paper we assume that the handler has to defend the food
whenever challenged and no individual can give up the fight at any moment,
an individual cannot vary the time it spends in the handling period once
it begins handling (nevertheless, the length of the period depends on the
behavior of others). Consequently, to maximize the proportion of time spent
handling h, and thus its fitness, the individual should try to minimize TS .
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3. Evolutionarily Stable Strategies
We now consider the various situations that an individual may face, and
what the best strategy is in each case. In particular, if a group of i individuals
involved in a contest is observed, should a bird challenge or not (i.e. what
should its value of pi be)? We shall assume that all other individuals in
the population play the strategy p = (p1, p2, . . .) and we consider a mutant
individual playing q = (q1, q2, . . .). We find what ESSs are possible, and
then conditions for each of them to actually be ESSs.
3.1. Possible ESSs
Here we show that any ESS must be a strategy Vk which challenges any
groups of size less than k and no other. When faced with the opportunity
to challenge a group of size i the best option is the one which has the least
expected time to become a handler. If one does not challenge, the expected
time is TS . If one challenges, the Markov property guarantees that the con-
test takes an average time of tc no matter whether and how many challengers
join the group. Thus the expected time taken for an individual to become
a handler when joining such a contest already containing i individuals is
tc + 0× pii+1 + TS × (1− pii+1)
Comparing TS with the above shows that an individual should joint a con-
test if
pii+1
tc
>
1
TS
. (10)
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Thus, by (??), qi = 1 is optimal if
pii+1 − tcνff + tc
∞∑
j=1
µjgjqj(pii+1 − pij+1) > 0. (11)
Otherwise, qi = 0 is optimal.
The left-hand term of (??) is clearly decreasing with i, so that for any
internally consistent set of qis (i.e. each qj is optimal in conjunction with
q= (q1, q2, q3, . . .)), optimal invading strategies must be of the form qi = 1,
for i < k and qi = 0, for i ≥ k, for some constant k; i.e. groups up to a
certain size only should be challenged.
We have shown that if any strategy can invade residents playing p, a
strategy Vk, for some k, can invade. What is the ”best” of such potentially
invading strategies will depend upon the values of the pis, while although
they do not appear in (??) explicitly, they do implicitly since the gis and
piis are functions of them. Note also that any strategy p which is not of
the form Vk must be invadable, since we can consider a ’mutant’ which
plays p exactly. It clearly performs equally well to the resident population,
but above we have shown that there is a better mutant, which hence must
invade. We can thus confine our attentions to the strategies Vk.
For a population all playing Vk, the maximum group size is k, occurring
when a group of size k − 1 is challenged. We can use (??) to find the value
of s, and then (??), (??), (??), and (??) to give the values of h, g2, gi, and
pii. Each of these will depend upon the value of k and we thus label the
values of s, h, gi and pii for a population playing strategy Vk as sk, hk, gi,k
and pii,k respectively.
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νff 0.01 0.11 0.21 0.31 0.41 0.51 0.61 0.71 1.21 2.51
s7 963 749 640 568 515 474 441 414 321 213
h7 9.63 82 134 176 211 242 269 294 389 535
g2,7 4.73 35 52 64 72 78 82 86 95 94
g3,7 2.32 15 20 23 24 25 25 25 23 16
g4,7 1.14 6.47 7.97 8.36 8.31 8.06 7.72 7.35 5.59 2.90
g5,7 0.56 2.77 3.11 3.03 2.82 2.59 2.36 2.15 1.36 0.509
g6,7 0.27 1.19 1.21 1.10 0.960 0.83 0.72 0.63 0.03 0.01
g7,7 0.26 0.89 0.78 0.62 0.5 0.4 0.32 0.26 0.11 0.02
Table 2. Proportion of individuals and groups (times 103) for strategy V7 as νff
varies. Other parameter values are th = 1, tc = 1, µi = µ1 = 1. Note that the
proportion of individuals involved in a fight in the group of size i is igi and not
gi.
For illustration we give a numerical example; the densities of the various
group sizes for the example population V7 are shown in Table ??. As the
rate of finding food increases, the densities of searchers declines, the density
of handlers increases, and the density of groups of each size first increases
and then declines.
3.2. Conditions for strategy Vk to be an ESS.
Consider a population of individuals playing Vk. When can an individual
playing Vl invade?
If l > k then groups of resident individuals form only up to size k, so that
our individual may challenge such a group, but will never get the opportu-
nity to challenge larger groups. Thus the strategy indicated for encounters
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with such groups is irrelevant, and the payoff to any strategy Vl, l > k is
identical, and so equal to the payoff of Vk+1.
Now suppose that l < k. Vl invades Vk when TS is smaller for the invader
than for the resident. By (??), this happens if
1 + tc
∑l−1
i=1 µigi,k
νff +
∑l−1
i=1 µigi,kpii+1,k
<
1 + tc
∑k−1
i=1 µigi,k
νff +
∑k−1
i=1 µigi,kpii+1,k
which is equivalent to
k−1∑
i=l
µigi,k
νfftc − pii+1,k + tc l−1∑
j=1
µjgj,k(pij+1,k − pii+1,k)
 > 0 (12)
The term in brackets in (??) increases with both l and i. For l = k − 1
there is just a single term, and if this is negative then invasion does not
occur. If l < k − 1, then the expression consists of the sum of several of
these terms, all smaller than the i = l = k − 1 term, so that invasion of Vl
cannot occur for l < k − 1 if it does not occur for Vk−1.
A strategy Vk is thus an ESS if and only if it can resist invasion by
both Vk−1 and Vk+1 for k ≥ 2 (V1 must resist invasion only from V2). This
is equivalent to saying that in a population of Vk individuals the optimal
strategy when encountering a group of size k − 1 is to challenge (qk−1 = 1)
and the optimal strategy against a group of size k is not to challenge (qk =
0). By (??), this is equivalent to
tcνff >
1
k + 1
− tc
k−1∑
i=1
µigi,k
(
pii+1,k − 1
k + 1
)
(13)
tcνff <
1
k
− tc
k−1∑
i=1
µigi,k
(
pii+1,k − 1
k
)
, (14)
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since, in a population of Vk individuals, pik,k = 1/k and pik+1,k = 1/(k + 1)
for any mutant that challenged a group of size k; note that pii,k < 1i for
i < k.
Notice that the right hand side of (??) is always smaller then the right
hand side of (??). Thus since (??) is satisfied for sufficiently large tcνff ,
there is an interval of values of tcνff for which Vk is an ESS.
It follows directly from (??) that V1 cannot be invaded by V2 if and only
if
tcνff >
1
2
.
It is easy to see from (??) and the fact that 1/k ≤ pii,k < 1/i for i < k,
tcνff <
1
2 is a necessary condition for Vk to be an ESS when k > 1.
3.3. Overlapping regions and multiple ESSs
We start to consider the possibility of multiple ESSs with a range of numer-
ical examples. Table ?? shows the different group sizes for the ESS strategy
for varying νff with other parameters fixed (note that for νff = 0.31 there
are two ESSs and both of these are given).
Figure ?? shows the range of values of νff for which each of the strate-
gies Vk are ESSs for k = 1, 2, . . . , 10. We are particularly interested in the
overlaps between the regions, when there are multiple ESSs.
Table ?? shows the range of νff where specific Vk are ESSs for different
values of P , following on from Figure ??. The cases with multiple ESSs
required the combination of little food and large encounter rates, leading to
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νff 0.11 0.21 0.31 0.31 0.41 0.51
ESS k=7 k=4 k=3 k=2 k=2 k=1
sk 0.749 0.644 0.577 0.596 0.540 0.662
hk 0.082 0.135 0.179 0.185 0.221 0.338
g2,k 0.035 0.053 0.065 0.110 0.119 0
g3,k 0.015 0.021 0.038 0 0 0
g4,k 0.006 0.013 0 0 0 0
g5,k 0.003 0 0 0 0 0
g6,k 0.001 0 0 0 0 0
g7,k 0.0009 0 0 0 0 0
Table 3. Group sizes for ESSs as νff varies, other parameter values: th = 1, tc =
1, µi = µ1 = 1.
intense contests and very little consumption, which of course is not realis-
tic. However, for more realistic encounter rates, there will be overlaps, but
perhaps not more than two or three ESSs for any given value of νff .
By comparing the right-hand side of (??) for Vk and the right-hand side
of (??) for Vk+1, as we do in the Appendix, we see that there is an overlap
between successive regions.
For small encounter rates µi ≈ 0 the conditions (??) and (??) reduce to
1
k
> νfftc >
1
k + 1
which means almost no overlaps between the ESSs. On the other hand,
for extremely large µis, any fight effectively ends up as a fight between
k individuals and thus pii,k ≈ 1/k which means that the condition (??)
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Fig. 2. Ranges of νff for specific Vk to be ESS. a) µi = µ1 = 0.1, b) µi = µ1 = 1,
c) µi = µ1 = 10, d) µi = µ1 = 100, e) µi = µ1 = 1000. Other parameter values
are th = 1 and tc = 1.
becomes
νfftc > 0
and so there are significant overlaps between a large number of strategies.
4. Discussion
Kleptoparasitic contests involving multiple competitors are common in na-
ture (Steele and Hockey, 1995), but have not before now been modelled
mathematically. In this paper we have developed the model of Broom and
Ruxton (1998) to allow for such contests. In contrast to previous models
(Broom and Ruxton, 1998; Broom and Rychta´rˇ, 2007) when a group of
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k\ µi 0.1 1 10 100 1000
1 [.5,∞) [.5,∞) [.5,∞) [.5,∞) [.5,∞)
2 [.330, .500) [.304,.500) [.207, .500) [.068, .500) [.0100, .500)
3 [.246, .329] [.220, .314] [.149, .296] [.053, .289] [.0078, .286]
4 [.196, .245] [.170, .222] [.113, .194] [.046, .184] [.0077, .178]
5 [.163, .195] [.137, .17] [.089, .136] [.039, .125] [.0079, .118]
6 [.139, .162] [.114, .136] [.071, .101] [.035, .087] [.0080, .083]
7 [.121, .138] [.098, .113] [.058, .078] [.03, .065] [.0081, .061]
8 [.108, .12] [.085, .097] [.049, .062] [.025, .05] [.0080, .046]
9 [.097, .107] [.075, .084] [.041, .051] [.023, .039] [.0078, .036]
10 [.087, .096] [.068, .074] [.035, .042] [.02, .032] [.0075, .028]
Table 4. Ranges of νff where specific Vk is an ESS with varying µi; other pa-
rameter values: th = 1, tc = 1.
individuals contesting a food item is observed, then it is possible for the ob-
server to join the contest in the hope of acquiring the food item. The chance
of success will decrease with the number of other competitors, and we inves-
tigate a number of possible scenarios. For a defined challenging behaviour
we find the equilibrium distribution of the sizes of the population density
in each of the different categories of activity; there is a single equation for
the density of searchers, from which all other densities can be found.
In particular we are interested in the possible strategies of individuals,
and finding the best strategies under different conditions. We find ESSs for
various parameter values. It is likely of course, that some of the parameter
values will vary during the course of an individual’s life, especially through-
out the year. For example food availability is likely to be affected by seasonal
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factors. Thus if individuals played only the fixed strategies that we mention
here, they could be outcompeted by those with more flexible strategies. In
common with earlier models (Broom and Ruxton, 1998; Luther and Broom,
2004; Broom et al., 2004), we assume that individuals rather have the abil-
ity to respond to certain cues to gauge the level of different parameters,
and so be capable of adjusting between the different Vk over the course of
a season. Provided individuals are capable of making this switch efficiently,
then consideration of the ESSs for any fixed set of parameters is sufficient
to find the correct behaviour. However if there is more than one ESS for
a given parameter set, the history of the parameter values could play an
important role in determining which solution would be chosen in practice.
Thus it would be of interest to investigate such variable parameters.
It should be noted that strategies considered in the present paper are
more complex here than in most previous models e.g. Broom et al. (2004).
In this and related models, when a challenge is made (and resisted) then the
contest duration is fixed, its real cost is determined by the level of foraging
success that could be expected when not in the contest and the benefit of
being in the contest is fixed as well (often, the contest is won 50% of the
time). In our model further individuals may challenge groups and this makes
the evaluation of the benefits of entering the contest more complex. It is for
this reason that we see many possible strategies, and that multiple ESSs
can occur for a given set of parameters.
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Earlier models did come up with interesting predictions based upon dif-
ferent assumptions to the model in the current paper. For instance Broom
et al (2004) allowed individuals to decline to resist attacks, and the strat-
egy of attacking but never resisting, termed Marauder, was shown to be
stable for a large range of parameter values. Such short contests with the
defender offering no resistance have been discovered in real populations,
for example in wading birds (Stillman et al., 1997). The model of Broom
and Ruxton (2003) allowed individuals to feed on items which had constant
handling time, and to make choices based upon the length of handling time
remaining. Optimal choices were found which depended upon the critical
remaining handling time, so that items which were consumed continuously
were challenged for only if there was sufficient remaining handling time, but
items which were consumed at once at the end of the handling time, as here,
were challenged for only if the remaining time was sufficiently short.
We show that when individuals may or may not challenge groups of any
size, the only viable strategies involve only challenging groups up to a cer-
tain size, and always challenging these. Thus there are an infinite number
of possible strategies. Individuals display varying levels of ”Hawkish” be-
haviour, rather than just Hawk or Dove, or more appropriately (since all
individuals resist attacks) Hawk or Retaliator (Maynard Smith, 1982). We
have derived conditions as functions of our parameters for different strate-
gies to be ESSs. It should be noted that since the rate that the population
acquires food (its uptake rate) is proportional to the proportion of handlers
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hk, it decreases with the size of group individuals are prepared to challenge.
Its largest value is given by the classical result from Holling (1959) when no
individuals challenge, but only forage, and falls away sharply if individuals
challenge handlers only (Broom and Ruxton, 1998, and see also Ruxton and
Moody, 1997, when all individuals were compelled to fight).
We have found that there is always at least one ESS. As we vary the
food density we can see how the pattern of ESSs changes. From high food
availability we move from never challenging being an ESS, to challenging
only handlers, to challenging handlers and fighting pairs and so on. As the
availability of food declines, individuals are willing to challenge larger and
larger groups. As the population moves from one situation to the next,
there is an overlap region where both strategies are ESSs (except when
going from no challenges to challenging handlers only). If the encounter
rate is small, the overlap is small, and in most scenarios there will be a
single ESS. However, for larger encounter rates this overlap can become
substantial; in fact it can be sufficiently large for there to be three or more
ESSs. It should be noted that these situations only occur for very (generally
unrealistically) large encounter rates, when competition for food is intense.
They are theoretically possible however, and situations where there are three
ESSs are plausible.
In Broom and Ruxton (1998) and subsequent models, this overlap has
not previously been observed, because only handlers could be challenged,
and there is no overlap between the no challenge (V1) and only challenge
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handlers (V2) regions. It is possible to have two ESSs simultaneously, be-
cause an individual chooses to challenge a group of given size if and only
if the rate that it finds food by not challenging is sufficiently poor. Unless
we are considering the rate of finding food of an individual which does not
challenge handlers (which is always νff), this rate is reduced the more oth-
ers in the population are prepared to challenge, and so it can be best to
challenge if all others are going to challenge, and not challenge if they are
all not going to challenge. Situations with more than one ESS have been
found in other models, often for similar reasons (that the strategies of oth-
ers not involved in a particular contest affects this background uptake rate)
but never a potentially unlimited number of ESSs as in the current paper.
The model developed in this paper predicts significantly different be-
haviour to those allowed in previous models (Broom et al., 2004; Broom
and Rychta´rˇ, 2007; Luther et al., 2007) in particular when food is quite rare
and/or encounter rates are large. When food is plentiful it pays nobody
to fight, and the extra possibility of multiple contests adds nothing. If the
encounter rates are small, individuals are unlikely to chance upon compet-
ing groups; thus although theoretically their strategy might be to challenge
groups of size seven or less, they will rarely in practice experience such a
situation. Our model is also only realistic if individuals are foraging in close
proximity and it takes some time to handle the food. For instance Shealer
and Spendelow (2002) examined a real situation where foragers travelled
significant distances to find food, but had to return to the nest site to feed
Kleptoparasitic melees 21
their young, and kleptoparasites waited near the nest to try to steal. Multi-
ple fights would be possible in this situation, but the symmetry of our model
would be lost, as there would be at least two distinct types of individual in
the population, as modelled in Luther et al. (2007).
In this paper we have extended the original and simplest of a series of
recent game theoretic models of kleptoparasitic behaviour, so that to allow
for multiple contests we have re-introduced some of the original simplifica-
tions of this model. It would be of interest to develop the current model with
some of the more complex features of later models. For instance in Broom
et al. (2004) individuals did not have to resist challenges, and handlers had
a different probability of success to subsequent challengers.
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6. Appendix
6.1. Evaluating the proportions at the equilibrium
The solutions of the system of differential equations (??), (??), (??) tend
to equilibrium exponentially fast (see e.g. Luther & Broom, 2004). Hence,
the time derivatives can be considered 0 and by labeling the following sum-
mations
FT =
∞∑
i=2
igi
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GT =
∞∑
i=2
gi
GS =
∞∑
i=2
µipigi
we obtain
0 =
h
th
− νffs+ 1
tc
(FT −GT )− µ1p1sh− sGS (15)
0 = νffs− h
th
− µ1p1sh+ 1
tc
GT (16)
0 = µ1shp1 − g2
(
1
tc
+ µ2sp2
)
(17)
0 = (µi−1spi−1)gi−1 −
(
1
tc
+ µispi
)
gi i = 3, 4, . . . (18)
Equation (??) rearranges to give
gi =
µi−1pi−1s
µipis+ 1/tc
gi−1 = g2
i∏
j=3
(
µj−1pj−1s
µjpjs+ 1/tc
)
This in turn gives
FT = g2
∞∑
i=2
i
i∏
j=3
(
µj−1pj−1s
µjpjs+ 1/tc
)
GT = g2
∞∑
i=2
i∏
j=3
(
µj−1pj−1s
µjpjs+ 1/tc
)
GS = g2
∞∑
i=2
µipi
i∏
j=3
(
µj−1pj−1s
µjpjs+ 1/tc
)
We now have the system completely expressed in terms of known parame-
ters, assuming at this stage that the values of the pis are known, and the
three unknowns s, h and g2. We now proceed to find expressions for each of
s, h and g2.
Equation (??) implies that
∞∑
i=3
gi +
∞∑
i=3
tcµipisgi =
∞∑
i=2
tcµipisgi
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and hence
GT =
∞∑
i=2
gi = g2 + tcµ2p2sg2 = (1 + tcµ2p2s)g2.
From (??) we also get, for any k > i+ 1,
tcµipisgi = (1 + tcµh(i+1)pi+1s)gi+1
=
k∑
j=i+1
gj + tcµhkpksgk =
∞∑
j=i+1
gj
using the fact that gi → 0 as i→∞, and letting k →∞. Thus,
tcsGS =
∞∑
i=2
tcµipisgi =
∞∑
i=2
 ∞∑
j=i+1
gj

=
∞∑
i=2
(i− 2)gi = FT − 2GT
and so
FT − tcsGS = 2GT = 2(1 + tcµ2p2s)g2 (19)
From (??) it is clear that equations (??), (??) and (??) multiplied by two
add to zero and so there are really only two equations here. The third
equation for our three unknowns comes from the fact that every individual
is in exactly one state, so that
s+ h+
∞∑
i=2
fi = s+ h+ FT = 1 (20)
Equations (??), (??) and (??) yield
h = thνffs. (21)
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This now means, using (??), that
g2 =
tcµ1p1thνffs
2
1 + tcµ2p2s
(22)
We thus have every other density term (h, g2, g3, . . .) expressed as a function
of s. Finally we obtain an equation for s by substitution into (??). This yields
1 = s+ h+ FT = s(1 + thνff) + g2
∞∑
i=2
i
i∏
j=3
(
tcµj−1pj−1s
tcµjpjs+ 1
)
= s(1 + thνff) + thνffs
∞∑
i=2
i
i∏
j=2
(
tcµj−1pj−1s
tcµjpjs+ 1
)
6.2. Calculation of the searching time.
Let TS be the expected time to become a handler for a searching individual
who uses a strategy q = (q1, q2, . . .) in the population where everybody else
uses a strategy p = (p1, p2, . . .) and let pii denote the probability of becoming
a handler at the end of the contest when presently in a group of size i. We
shall first consider individuals which join a contest. The Markov property
guarantees that contests end at rate 1/tc irrespective of the size of the
group or whether new individuals have challenged since our focal individual
joined the group. Thus the expected time taken for an individual to become
a handler when joining such a contest already containing i individuals is
tc + 0× pii+1 + TS × (1− pii+1)
where tc is the fight time, 0 × pii+1 relates to the case that the individual
eventually wins the fight, and TS×(1−pii+1) relates to the case that it loses
the fight and has to search again. Following on from this, the expected time
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to become a handler from the searching position is
TS =
1
νff +
∑∞
i=1 µigiqi
+
νff
νff +
∑∞
i=1 µigiqi
· 0
+
1
νff +
∑∞
i=1 µigiqi
∞∑
i=1
µigiqi
(
tc +
(
pii+1 · 0 + (1− pii+1)TS
))
where the terms correspond to 1) the time needed to encounter something,
2) the probability of encountering a food item (times 0 as the food is already
found), and finally 3) the probabilities of encountering a group of size i times
the time needed to become a handler after such an encounter. Hence,
TS =
1 + tc
∑∞
i=1 µigiqi
νff +
∑∞
i=1 µigiqipii+1
. (23)
6.3. Calculation of pii.
Since pii is the probability of becoming a handler when in a group of size i,
clearly pi1 = 1. For groups of size at least two, the next event that occurs
is either the resolution of a contest, so that all individuals have an equal
chance of gaining the food, or a new individual joining a contest. A new
individual joins with probability
ρi =
µipis
1/tc + µipis
=
tcµipis
1 + tcµipis
(24)
so that, for i ≥ 2,
pii =
1
i
(1− ρi) + ρipii+1. (25)
Note that it follows immediately from (??) that
pii+1 < pii
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since, trivially, pii+1 < 1i . From (??) we also obtain
pii =
1
i
(1− ρi) + ρi
(
1
i+ 1
(1− ρi+1) + ρi+1pii+2
)
= . . .
=
1
i
−
∞∑
l=i
1
l(l + 1)
l∏
j=i
ρj =
1
i
−
∞∑
l=i
1
l(l + 1)
l∏
j=i
tcµipis
1 + tcµipis
since
∏l
j=i ρj → 0 as l→∞.
We will now consider the overlaps between strategies Vk. From (??) -
since for Vk, pi takes value 1 for i < k and 0 otherwise - it is clear that
sk decreases with k. This in turn means that hk, by (??), g2,k, by (??),
and gi,k, by (??), all decrease with k. The intuitively clear result that also
pii,k > pii,k+1 for all i = 2, · · · and all k = 2, . . . was checked numerically for
a large range of parameter values, although we have been unable to prove
this mathematically. Assuming this result we obtain
tc
k−1∑
i=1
µigi,k
(
1
k + 1
− pii+1,k
)
< tc
k∑
i=1
µigi,k+1
(
1
k + 1
− pii+1,k+1
)
(26)
because the extra term for i = k of the sum on the right hand side of the
above inequality is 0 since pik+1,k+1 = 1/(k + 1). Consequently, there are
always some parameter values such that tcνff lies between those two and
thus there is always an overlap between Vk and Vk+1.
